By Edward Erwin
More than a century has handed when you consider that Sigmund Freud begun his groundbreaking paintings in psychoanalysis but there's no consensus approximately his legacy; in its place there's chronic war of words not just approximately Freud's acceptance and position in historical past yet in regards to the right criteria to take advantage of in comparing his thought and therapy.
This publication develops epistemological criteria for Freudian psychology and offers a accomplished review of, and doubtless ultimate, verdict on Freud's thought and remedy. in contrast to the other review released up to now, it incorporates a systematic dialogue of either the Freudian experimental and non-experimental proof and the right kind criteria for analyzing the evidence.
Part I considers the view that Freud's thought could be judged by way of precise evidential criteria deemed acceptable for judging hypotheses of common-sense psychology. Edward Erwin argues by contrast view and for the employment of criteria acceptable to causal hypotheses of either the normal and social sciences. Erwin additionally addresses different matters approximately criteria resembling the necessity for experimental facts, using placebo controls, the correct pursuits of psychotherapy, and using meta-analysis in reading consequence data.
The criteria constructed partially I of the ebook are utilized in half II in comparing the simplest to be had Freudian evidence.
A Bradford Book
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Additional info for A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian Psychology
Before leaving thematic afªnities, we might consider an attempt to weave them into an abductive type of inference. Mathias Kettner (1991, 174) argues that an analyst need not base causal inferences on the strength of meaning afªnities alone so long as an extra premise is available: that meanings and their afªnities are causally embedded in interpretive processes belonging to a single causally connected mental life, namely, that of the person analyzed. I have no doubt that this extra premise can be conªrmed, but what is left unclear is how this premise will help warrant Freudian hypotheses.
The connection between intention and action cannot be causal, according to Nussbaum (196), because in order to explain an action, the connection must be described by an analytic statement. It must be so described, Nussbaum argues (195–196), because to explain an event, we must ªrst identify it, and that requires that we construct a practical syllogism of the following form: P intends to bring about b. P believes (considers, thinks) he cannot bring about b unless he does a. P does a. The above “syllogism,” Nussbaum contends (195), is best understood as a hypothetical statement, which, he claims, is analytically true.
Interpretation reveals causation, because that’s the kind of system a human being is. (Nagel’s italics, 56) Referring to the above principle, Nagel says “That’s what I mean by intuitive plausibility, and it necessarily applies in the ªrst instance to speciªc explanations, rather than to general principles” (56). What reason do we have for thinking that Nagel’s principle is correct? An a priori justiªcation is not likely to sufªce. It is not an obvious necessary truth that a reason that justiªes an action from an agent’s point of view was also a cause of it.